

SENATE RECORD VOTE ANALYSIS

104th Congress
1st Session

Vote No. 330

July 26, 1995, 2:26 p.m.
Page S-10696 Temp. Record

BOSNIA ARMS EMBARGO/Security Council Vote to End Embargo

SUBJECT: Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995 . . . S. 21. Nunn/Graham/Robb amendment No. 1848, as amended, to the Dole substitute amendment No. 1801.

ACTION: AMENDMENT AGREED TO, 75-23

SYNOPSIS: As introduced, S. 21, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995, will terminate the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Dole substitute amendment would terminate the arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina following: the receipt of a request from that Government for a termination of the embargo and a request by that Government to the United Nations Security Council for a departure of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina; or a decision by the United Nations Security Council or decisions by countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR, to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Implementation of that termination would be completed by the earlier of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR or 12 weeks after Bosnia requested a withdrawal, unless the President exercised the waiver authority which would be granted by this amendment.

The Nunn/Graham/Robb amendment, as amended, would add the requirement for the United States, if the Bosnian Government requested the departure of UNPROFOR personnel or if the countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR decided to withdraw their forces, to introduce immediately and to support in the United Nations Security Council a resolution to terminate the international arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United States would insist on a vote on that resolution, which at a minimum would require a termination of the embargo no later than the completion date of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia. Additionally, the amendment would add the finding that "The Contact Group, composed of representatives of the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany, has since July 1994 maintained that in the event of continuing rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the contact Group's proposal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision in the United Nations Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms embargo as a last resort would be unavoidable." As amended (see vote No. 329), in the event the United Nations Security Council did not lift the arms embargo after a vote as provided in the Nunn/Graham/Robb

(See other side)

YEAS (75)				NAYS (23)		NOT VOTING (2)	
Republican (39 or 74%)		Democrats (36 or 80%)		Republicans (14 or 26%)	Democrats (9 or 20%)	Republicans (1)	Democrats (1)
Abraham	Jeffords	Akaka	Kennedy	Brown	Biden	Bennett ²	Hollings ⁴
Ashcroft	Kassebaum	Baucus	Kerrey	Burns	Bryan		
Bond	Kempthorne	Bingaman	Kerry	D'Amato	Byrd		
Campbell	Kyl	Boxer	Kohl	Faircloth	Feingold		
Chafee	Lott	Bradley	Lautenberg	Grams	Feinstein		
Coats	Lugar	Breaux	Leahy	Gregg	Heflin		
Cochran	McCain	Bumpers	Levin	Hatfield	Moynihan		
Cohen	Murkowski	Conrad	Lieberman	Helms	Reid		
Coverdell	Nickles	Daschle	Mikulski	Inhofe	Rockefeller		
Craig	Packwood	Dodd	Moseley-Braun	Mack			
DeWine	Pressler	Dorgan	Murray	McConnell			
Dole	Roth	Exon	Nunn	Shelby			
Domenici	Santorum	Ford	Pell	Smith			
Frist	Simpson	Glenn	Pryor	Thomas			
Gorton	Snowe	Graham	Robb				
Gramm	Specter	Harkin	Sarbanes				
Grassley	Stevens	Inouye	Simon				
Hatch	Thompson	Johnston	Wellstone				
Hutchison	Thurmond						
	Warner						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

amendment, then the United States would "promptly endeavor to bring the issue before the General Assembly for decision as provided for in the Assembly's United for Peace Resolution of 1950."

Those favoring the amendment contended:

The United Nations current policy on Bosnia is an incoherent, dismal failure. The policy advocated by the Dole/Lieberman amendment also has many unanswered questions, but recent events have convinced us that we have no moral recourse left except to lift the embargo. One of the key problems of the amendment is that it would not make one last attempt to get the United Nations to lift the embargo multilaterally. The benefits of such a lifting would be numerous. First, it would remove the danger of Americanizing the war. If the whole world decides that Bosnia has the right to defend itself, it will not be likely that the United States will be left with the entire responsibility of providing arms. Second, it would reduce the danger that Russia and other nations would counter any effort to arm the Bosnians by providing more arms to the Serbians. Third, it would remove the possibility of open conflict between the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, as those allies enforced the embargo and the United States attempted to arm the Bosnians. These and other benefits clearly make it in the U.S. interest to make one last attempt to win the support of the United Nations for a lifting of the embargo. Passing this amendment would not result in any delay. The Dole/Lieberman amendment is clearly structured to allow for the removal of the embargo only after United Nations peacekeeping forces have been withdrawn. The Nunn/Graham/Robb amendment would provide that once the decision has been made to withdraw those forces, or once the Bosnian Government has asked them to withdraw and has asked for the lifting of the embargo, the United States will immediately seek a lifting of the embargo by the Security Council, and will insist on a vote. That vote would occur before the peacekeeping forces were withdrawn, and would thus be within the timetable of the Dole/Lieberman amendment. This amendment would in no way weaken or delay the effect of the Dole/Lieberman amendment. All it would do is require one more attempt to be made to have the embargo lifted multilaterally. It is a sensible proposal that merits our total support.

Those opposing the amendment contended:

Every sovereign nation has the right to defend itself. Voting on this right would effectively invalidate it. If the right to individual or collective self-defense can be denied by a vote, then it is not a right--it is an authority that is conferred. It does not matter whether the vote would carry or not--simply by voting the United Nations would be arrogating to itself the power to decide if Bosnia would be allowed to defend itself against an invading force. Setting this precedent would have enormous implications. It would make it possible to question, for example, the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with a Security Council or General Assembly vote. This precedent should not be set. We therefore must oppose the Nunn/Graham/Robb amendment.

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